Feel free to skip this post, as it is all about the religion tangent. I realize this is derailing Lord J's major topic and is a bit of a behemoth, so I won't be terribly upset if this is totally ignored! (I also performed a bit of archeology and unearthed some of the long tradition of religious debates at the Compendium before I wrote this: yikes. Little did I know what I'd gotten myself into when I posted in this thread, ha.)
My points can be summarized as:
1) Religion's problems often begin where culture and politics introduce them, and we can create a system that discourages and even disables that by shifting the focus of spiritual life to the experiential.
and, more importantly,
2) Humanity needs social methods to deal with what I call hierophanies (by way of Mircea Eliade). Religion can provide these methods.
All quotes are by Lord J because it's easier that way. And so, on we go to point 1:
1) Operational control over or influence upon society to promote social order favorable to the perpetuation of the religion itself;
You're giving religion a bit too much credit, I think. Religious
justification should not be mistaken for religious
impetus, and I'd say the former is far more common than the latter. Even the Spanish Inquisition was strongly motivated by politics; the religious thrust made it more vicious and menacing, and I would argue that the literalistic, exclusivist religious climate made the culture dangerously intolerant, but it was the breeding ground tilled by politics, culture, and religion working in tandem that made the Inquisition possible. The true problem is this: the dogmatic streaks in certain religions enable political and cultural concerns to be taken to violent extremes.
That tendency is considerably less potent when you aren't dealing with an evangelistic faith. Let's take Egyptian and Roman societies, for instance. Both societies strongly emphasized loyalty to the state and considered religion absolutely essential to the perpetuation of the kingdom. The concern was
not for the perpetuation of religion -- that idea would have been quite alien to them -- but for the political regime. And when a war was waged, one might invoke Sekhmet or Mars, but one did not
wage war in the name of those deities, and CERTAINLY not under the sanctimonious pretense that other cultures needed to be 'converted' to their worship! There have been no wars waged at all, to my knowledge, in the
name of a polytheistic god. This differs quite significantly from a worldview that cultivates an idea like "we must fight to save the Holy Land from the infidels." (Any religion with animism would be dumbfounded by that idea.
The Holy Land? Isn't there a land wight in my backyard?)
Such anxieties over the perpetuation of a religion are only really present in religions that have reason to maintain such anxieties. The transience of life, including the death of deities, is a matter that is considered over and over again in myth. There are religions where no fear exists that people halfway across the world are going to hell (which leads to a convenient validation for European racism and colonialist impulses) or that a 'false' religion will overtake the one, specific, immutable location that your religion calls 'holy'. In short, the polytheistic religions I'm familiar with accepted that all is mutable. This makes quite a difference!
(a disclaimer: I have my clear bias, but I recognize I'm glossing over a lot. Although I will defend the point that monotheism as you see it in the Abrahamics has certain scripturally-based
tendencies toward intolerance and absolutism, I could never call the religions that produced Rudolf Otto, Kierkegaard, Averroes, and Sufism completely debased and corrupt. Any Abrahamic readers are assured that I am just using monotheism as a convenient whipping boy to make the point that religions can take very different forms
My personal beliefs are certainly more nuanced than "polytheism good, monotheism bad." Especially considering that Abrahamics are not the only monotheists on the block.)
But these methodological or perhaps one might say "stylistic" considerations are independent of the underlying purposes of Abrahamic religions, which are in common with all other religions.
They certainly have commonalities, but differences in framework cannot be underestimated. The viral concept of Heresy, for instance, is not (to my knowledge) found in
any identifiable form within polytheism and animism. The closest analogs I can think of are the ideas of 'purity' and 'impurity' in terms of ritual preparedness, which do not really imply heresy at all (and certain chthonic rituals actually welcomed 'impurity'). There's also the idea of treason, which is explicitly political and framed in a different way. One could make the argument that Heresy is just the idea of the Profane taken to an extreme, but I would argue that this is an extremism made possible by absolutist inclinations, and, as we've seen, not all religions possess this.
.. history tells more tales of malignant religions than benign ones. The religions which preceded Abrahamic monotheism were not oriented toward humanistic ideals. All of them were, first and foremost, vehicles of control. The farther back in time you go, the more primitive and barbaric the religions become.
A few points. I'm making some assumptions about your underlying premises, but I think my impressions may be worth addressing. Apologies if I mistook you.
- You seem to have a Hobbesian "nasty, brutish and short" view of primitive cultures. That view has been dismantled, with many pains, by anthropology. I can provide plenty of sources for this, but one has only to look at a modern example of a healthy primitive society, like the animistic Kalash people, to see that it isn't so simple.
I believe in human progress -- I truly do -- but we cannot believe the lie that progress is a straight line towards happiness and decency. Agriculture was a landmark in human progress, but many agricultural societies were
far less egalitarian and fulfilled than many hunter-gatherer societies.
- You owe your humanistic ideals to the Greeks, J. Their society was incredibly flawed, but there is no doubt soever that they made humanism the paradigm possible, and the great engine of that humanistic power was their myths. (And some philosophers, but Plato was no humanist.) Personally, I consider many myths to be undeniably humanistic; certainly plenty were invoked by the great founders of humanism in its modern form.
Humanism hardly arose out of a religious vacuum in the Enlightenment, as the 19th century philosophers who began the "war" between science and religion would have it! And make no mistake about it:
the "war" between religion and science was begun by specific people with a specific, highly revisionist agenda. (You may know this already, but I feel it should be common knowledge, hence my ostentatious bolding.
)
- I'm trying to respond to your characterization of religions as malignant and benign. I think this may be easier to do if you provide me with some examples. What did you have in mind when you said that?
Tradition and religion are very different things.
I was actually referring to Zeality's use of the word tradition, which I read in the context of his larger point about religion. But I would also assert that they are not "very different." Tradition is a concept that incorporates plenty of what we ascribe to religion, so at points they are indistinguishable. It's true that tradition encompasses far more than religious history, though.
And now to point 2:
2) Relief from, and often justification of, human apprehensions and suffering through consoling storytelling made possible by faith;
4) Satisfaction (or repression) of the will's desire for relevance and meaningfulness (see #2, 3);
5) Conceptualization of indifferent natural phenomena, for meaningfulness (see #4) but also in itself to address human curiosity.
We can agree on 4. I don't
disagree with 2 or 5, per se, but if I understand them correctly, they are incomplete assessments.
Myth's functions extend to far more than just consolation and anthropomorphization. It's pretty common to characterize myth some kind of flimsy causal theory or as an opiate-for-the-masses, and to do so is to ignore the many myths which are disturbing, insightful, paradoxical, mysterious, and downright arresting. In the past two centuries the movement toward seeing myth in terms of an expression of fundamental human experiences has gained some prominence, and I'm a wholehearted proponent of this view.
Which leads me to my ultimate point. What you seem to be missing here -- though you may be alluding to it somehow in 4#? -- is Mircea Eliade's hierophany, the experience of the ineffable, what is clumsily described as "the sacred." Religion is, ideally, a way of understanding and cultivating personal hierophanic experiences. It is valuable because of the symbolism it has developed, through the rituals and iconography and vocabulary, to work with hierophanies.
These experiences are non-negotiable. Humans are simply going to have them and going to have to make sense of them, and science and reason will not service (metaphor and subjectivity being largely, though not entirely, out of their sphere of influence). A paradigm shift, one which respects these experiences and has methods by which to stave off the influence of powermongerers, and which encourages complexity and depth and creative fertility, could transform religion to a state where it maintains its uses to humanity and reduces them to politicians (because of the emphasis on the personal). The key to this is a return to true experiential mysticism, as I mentioned before. This requires much more of an emphasis on the individual than one currently finds, but as the needs of certain spiritual people must be met by formal, communal paradigms (which entails organization on a larger scale), I tend to think religion should stay, albeit in an altered and more localized form. Put simply, not everyone is cut out for the discipline of forming a spiritual framework all on their own-- they need resources, and religion can provide them.
However, as I mentioned, I think religion needs to transform itself to achieve this. I have some reason to think this is happening-- there are scientists, theologians, philosophers, mystics, and artists all heading in this direction, in what I believe may be the initial stirrings of a zeitgeist. We shall see.
And now the "is religion worth it" question.
My view is that religion is superfluous; even its best functions are more effective in other institutions, whereas religion introduces many evils you will find no where else, and justifies still more evils so very well.
Rather, I simply find it ideal to point out that effective tools are not necessarily worth using. We must consider more than their functional effectiveness. At what cost do we use them? What danger do they post to us? And, at an altogether higher level of abstraction, are the things they build going to enrich us?
I certainly agree with this second statement, and have sympathy for the first. You are correct, we do need to assess the effectiveness of religion versus the potentially disastrous downsides. At the moment, I think my proposed solution would work; if I'm wrong about that, well... I don't know. This is an excellent point.
For the record I am personally amenable to a transformation that would make Protestant Reformation look like Risk, and yes, I may even be amenable to the idea of outsourcing hierophantic functions to other institutions. (My personal vision for a more individualistic and pluralistic religious atmosphere includes stronger ties between art and religion, anyhow. I definitely think it is very healthy to think of religion in terms of art, as well as vice-versa. I'm biased, though. For me they are very much the same thing. There are a lot of people who would disagree with me quite strongly on that point.) It's a matter of how effective they would be and, since I am less pessimistic about religion than you are, I tip toward the 'keep religion' end of things.
What my defense amounts to is this: I want those who have some difficulty experiencing hierophanies, and interpreting their lives in a meaningful way, to have the framework which will serve their needs.
If other institutions can do this, I am open to their absorption of religion, even though the loss of the beautiful aspects of religion would be a very, very tragic event. So although I see some missteps in your assessment of religious history and religious function in society, J, I also don't know what your proposed plans for religion are (if indeed you've gone that far in fleshing out your ideas at this point), and I may well find them compelling. As you said, we're coming at this from pretty different conceptualizations.