Poll

If heaven exists, who deserves to go there?

The moral believers only
3 (27.3%)
The moral unbelievers only
1 (9.1%)
The moral and immoral believers only
2 (18.2%)
The moral believers and moral unbelievers only
5 (45.5%)

Total Members Voted: 10

Voting closed: April 12, 2006, 06:50:22 pm

Author Topic: A challenge to the religious  (Read 6619 times)

Lord J Esq

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Re: A challenge to the religious
« Reply #60 on: April 25, 2006, 04:57:38 am »
By the way, what DID Wikipedia say about Lutherans? I don't trust Wiki much myself, but I'm curious.

What better way to confront what you do not trust than by delving straight into it? Get ye into the lion's den, Daniel.

Daniel Krispin

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Re: A challenge to the religious
« Reply #61 on: April 25, 2006, 10:47:38 am »
By the way, what DID Wikipedia say about Lutherans? I don't trust Wiki much myself, but I'm curious.

What better way to confront what you do not trust than by delving straight into it? Get ye into the lion's den, Daniel.

Clever. It was just late when I wrote that, so I had to go to bed.

Thought

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Re: A challenge to the religious
« Reply #62 on: November 16, 2009, 05:53:07 pm »
Ah, such an interesting start to this thread! It is a shame that it devolved so quickly into an unrelated discussion on the authenticity of religious texts. It is also a shame that more discussion wasn’t had regarding morality!

So I shall address each in turn in the hopes that this lovely topic might be graced with better discussion.



Pascal’s Wager is one of those arguments that, if you truly believe the necessary assumptions, works well enough. Of course, if one doesn’t inherently believe those assumptions, it’s rather bunk. This anti-argument, however, makes the same mistake.

Allow me to discuss this bit by bit:

Argument #1: Who goes to heaven?

The author of this article makes a mistake in assuming that those who go to heaven are those that “should” go to heaven. That is, it assumes that the afterlife is merit based. Certainly, many religions do take the approach (if you were a Norseman back in the day, getting into Valhalla meant being selected to die on a battlefield), but not all. Since Pascal’s wager was a Christian argument to begin with, I will assume that this Anti-wager is specifically directed at Christian perceptions of the afterlife. Curiously, only a small portion of Christians believe (or, at least, are associated with denominations that believe) in such an afterlife. Christianity has two relevant dichotomies: that of faith v works and that of predestination v free will. Only those who believe in free will and works to the exclusion of faith will believe that access to heaven or hell is determined by merit. Curiously, as official denominations go, this is not a common stance. Though to be fair, American Christians to tend to be very works-focused, so I expect that if you talk to individuals rather than denominations, you will get more people who believe this.

Anywho, the significance of this is that Argument #1 only applies to a small number of Christians. The argument is very works based, but Christianity doesn’t function on that alone. This dichotomy is like breathing. Inhale, faith, exhale, works. You’ll suffocate if you only do one or the other.

Christians believe that entrance to heaven is based on grace, as accepted through faith. Now, that dichotomy means that though entrance is not dependent on what one does, one will work to achieve it nonetheless. One is saved by faith but faith inherently motivates works, which implies self-betterment (as well as social betterment). Earning heaven, under Christian beliefs, comes after getting in. Thus, God very well may wish to “fill heaven with the morally lazy, irresponsible, or untrustworthy,” and they may well not stay that way.

This would actually exclude, from, the beginning, the assumption that non-theists can earn the right to be let in, which voids the rest of the argument. But let us ignore than for now.

This argument assumes that heaven and hell are rewards/punishments, a dangerous theological stance to take.

Argument #2: Why This World?

The author of this article makes the unnecessary assumption that unless this world is a test, God could and would skip “actual life” and go straight to the afterlife. The world being a test is seen as an excuse for unexplained evils and god’s silence.

This assumes that unexplained evils are, well, unexplained or evil. These evils get listed under Argument #3, but allow me to discuss them here.

The experiences of Job are pointed to as being evil; he suffered so that God could win a bet. This, however, assumes that suffering is inherently evil, a point that the author does not argue. It is a curiosity that those humans who produce beautiful works of art often endure suffering. There are indications that at least some instances of suffering (I would not dare to claim that all instances) are actually good. Unpleasant, sure, but one should not confuse unpleasant with evil.

Then there are the citations of “genocidal slaughter and barbaric laws.” To address the latter first, without good arguments, the classification of “barbaric” must be disqualified. The word “barbarian” generally just means those outside our accepted civilization. One needs to show that those laws are specifically evil; one cannot merely appeal to the passing sensibilities of the modern day. For the former, meh, that is one of those points that a lot of Christians are uncomfortable with.

Which leads into the “natural disasters” of the world. Why do people die in earthquakes, for example? Well, considering that these are natural disasters, they tend to be very explainable. As for being evil, that seems to unnecessarily personify the universe. It isn’t so much that an earthquake attempts to kill people, people just happen to often get in the way. Humans distinguish “accidental death” from “intentional murder.” The later is evil, the former not so much.

And finally human evils are addressed. Let me put forward starvation: why does God allow children in Africa to starve? The assumption is that either he does not have the power to help them, does not care to help them, or is “testing” them. I would postulate a fourth option, that God has delegated that authority and responsibility to Humanity. Humanity currently has the power to feed children in Africa, so if we apply the same reasoning, we must either not care of be testing them… for what, I don’t know. The question, then, is if it would be better for God to solve humanities problems forcibly, or for God to attempt to help humans solve humanities problems. Individuals can reasonably take both sides.

There is always the possibility that the growth that individuals undergo by living life is itself desirable. Therefore, life, even a life in an unpleasant world, may be itself necessary. It may not be, but the author doesn’t consider this possibility.

To note, the author’s arguments concerning free will are poorly formulated. Humans are in no way random number generators. Given a limited number of possible outcomes, a device capable of producing all those outcomes, and enough time, any specific outcome will eventually be produced. There is no particular reason to believe that, if given an infinite amount of time, someone who accepted God and is in heaven will suddenly reject him. Free will just means we are capable of doing something, not that we will necessarily do something.

Argument #3: No God or Evil God

Burning Zeppelin actually already addressed this one, but to sum up the fault here, the author is assuming that “morality” and the divine are separate things, that it would be possible for an evil god to exist. This necessitates that a moral law exists apart from that god. This is directly contradictory to any absolute creationary deity. If there is an absolute creationary deity, then that deity created the moral law. If, then, one were to be shown that such a deity behaved in a manner that one thinks is evil, one should actually change one’s own behavior. Thus, in such a situation, a “genuinely good person” would actually work to adjust their morality to fit the true moral code as created by the evil-seeming deity. If one is wrong, one should be willing to admit that one is wrong.

Also, the author states that in the bible Abraham discards humanity and morality in order to follow God’s command to kill his son Isaac. This again assumes that morality exists apart from God; certainly, one can believe that, but not all theists do. The author did not bother to actually argue this point, taking it as assumed. Additionally, the author places loyalty to one’s genetic offspring over loyalty to the divine. Again this is a viable stance, it cannot be one that is taken as a given. It therefore disenfranchises some theists from the scope of this argument, and thus makes the article itself less useful.

Additionally, because this matter was not resolved, even if we assume that those let into heaven will be those who have earned it, this obscures the earning process. If morality is defined by the divine, then the non-theist who follows a perceived moral code that is in contrast to appearance of the divine will actually be the one doing evil, even as they seek to do good. Thus, by the author’s final argument, they’d be excluded.

Argument #4: The Test

The author is correct to an extent; if one assumes the numerous assumptions he has made in the previous sections, then only nontheists would get into heaven. The argument is very limited in scope, however, as only a small portion of theists would be willing to make the assumptions necessitated by it (and I would hope only a small number of nontheists would be so easily pulled into a poor argument). This is exactly in the same manner as Pascal’s wager (for which only a small portion of non-theists would be willing to make the assumptions necessitated by it).

It is a poor counter to a poor argument. Though I suppose it is commendable that they are on equal footing in that regard.



Among the proverbs of the Anglo-Saxon language, there is one that I half recall as a being particularly well suited to a discussion of morality. This proverb vaguely likened truth to honey, causing most translators to interpret it as meaning that truth is sweet, though there is a minority of individuals who claim that a better translation is that truth is sticky. I am comfortable with both; truth is a delicious thing to discover, but it is a messy business.

So it is with morality. It is a sticky, messy business attempting to extract truth from our upbringing and preconceived notions. As Daniel had previously noted in this thread, morality isn’t tied to religion, but it would be imprudent to say that our moral perceptions are not influenced by religion, either. Even for the atheists in the room, “not killing” was probably taught first as a religious tenant and discovered second as a humanist imperative.

Anywho, I am becoming overly romantic about the topic. Let me propose that at its heart morality must be eternal and objective. This is one of the great dangers of our perspectives; in order to taste the sweetness of true morality we must be capable of pushing through the mess of our modern quasi-morals (“quasi-morals” as in those things which we believe are moral but are not timeless). It is very tempting for us to assume that our modern morals cannot be improved upon, but such is hogwash, through and through. Some elements of them surely are, but I am afraid only time will reveal which ones are passing fads and rubbish that later generations will marvel at us for believing.

Of course, eternal and objective are almost one in the same. An objective individual in any time period should be able to deduce these same morals, and these morals should be in place in any time period for one to deduce. At the risk of spreading this sweet mess to physics, I would propose that essentially morals are a universal constant, akin to pi (mmmm…. pie).

I will confess, however, that for being a universal constant, morality is a trickier than Proteus to pin down. We say that killing is bad, and yet most of us can think of instances where killing may be necessary and proper. We say that animals have rights that impose upon human behavior, yet we will often still favor humans over others.

Oddly, perhaps the clearest moral code that appears to be timeless and objective has come from the non-human: robots.

Are the three laws of robotics really a beautiful moral code?

1) A human may not injure another human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2) A human must obey any orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3) A human must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.

One might hesitate at the second law, noting that is requires all people to be servants to everyone else. However, I would note that the first law should prevent that from being a harmful thing. No human should ever order another human to do anything except that which is best (as anything less could be considered harmful). Thus, #2 is really a command to take good advice and act upon it.

Unfortunately even in that we can imagine problems (what to do if inaction will allow a human being to come to harm but action will harm another human being?), but this might be a start.