I'd like to know their explanation for just how Noah got a T-Rex into the same boat with a cow and not end up with the cow being eaten. That flood lasted a while; T-Rex would have gotten hungry at some point. I guess this calls for ... the Chrono Beef!
Simple, God provided. Creationism is usually internally consistent (depending, of course, on who is doing the "explaining"), which is one of the things that makes it difficult to dispel.
Of course, if it isn't consistent with the evidence, it's still wrong.
Biologically speaking, there is presently one human race.
Actually, biologically speaking there is presently only one human species. These things get organized by Kingdom, Order, Species, etc, but not "race." 
Still, I think we all understand what he meant, even if the semantics of it are easily debatable.
A better answer still!
And now, to the meat.
Just out of curiosity, what would you consider to be valid evidence of such a thing? I am not trying to be argumentative, but merely attempting to understand a different model. You say there is no evidence for any sort of god, I'd say there is good evidence for the existence of a very specific deity. Thus I am concluding we had different criteria for what we consider valid evidence, and thus I am curious to what this difference is.
It would be hard for me to think of a particular thing or event that would sway me. I'm afraid the best I can do at present is to say that if there were scientific proof that either the universe could not have come into being, exist, or operate without the deliberate intervention of an external concious actor I'd be forced to conclude that there was a god of some sort, or at the very least a being we may as well call a god.
Unfortunately such studies are inherently flawed. First of all, try to imagine an investigator who found a positive correlation between prayer and wellness getting published. What journal might accept such a paper? Secondly, consider what the experiments are actually testing and compare that to what prayer is actually for. The experiments are looking for a positive result to the individual's health but prayer (depending on the religion) is never a "if-then" event. Even among religious circles, praying for an individual to make a recovery does not doctrinally necessitate a recovery. Thirdly, such experiments also consider only those unaccountable events of recovery, which negates the possibility of prayer producing a result in mundane manners. From the religious perspective, a prayer for someone's healthy may be realized quite validly from the skills of a caring physician. Such results would be discounted by a study. Fourthly, prayer does not necessitate lineality (is that even a word or did I just make it up?). Religiously speaking, an answer to pray may be set in motion before the prayer is even made. Thus, in such experiments, if prayer is real then it would be impossible for the investigators to actually control the composition of each group. To use a genetics analogy, it is like looking for the effects of a treatment for a genetic anomaly without first distinguishing which group is the wildtype.
What you are asserting, in short, seems to be that the results of prayer will always be indistinguishable from the results of non-prayer, and the results of prayers answered will always be indistinguishable from the results of prayers ignored. From this, I would conclude that prayer is, at best, a way of making ones self (the pray-er) feel better about whatever it is they are praying about. However, if that is the goal of prayer, and it is as I understand your description, then prayer is just dishonest hope, as one is praying for the wellbeing of another while knowing that the only one they can affect is themselves. I grant, this is (obviously) from an atheist perspective.
Depends on what we mean by learning about God. Go study the Notre Dame Cathedral; science can tell you a lot about the building, and it can even suggest certain trains about its builder, but science can't tell you who that builder was or what they were like (or, indeed, even if there definitely was a builder). If we assume the universe has a creator, then that universe can tell us some things about that creator using the scientific method. But in no way can it tell us everything (or even important things).
Your analogy is flawed, as an omni-god is eternal, and the builders of Notre Dame were mortal men who lived and died. I argue that if a continuously existant omni-god deliberately intervenes in the world through prayer, and that if this god is honest and non-chaotic, there will ultimately emerge some sense of the nature of the omni-god, when one looks at all (or even a large set) of the omni-god's revelations.
You return by arguing that if we look at a structure built by long-dead mortals, what we can learn about the builders from examining the building is critically limited. The two situations are not analagous.
Pish posh. Pascal's Wager doesn't need to be applied to a specific religion; it is still a valid arguement if the choice is between atheism and theism (if that is still a false dilema, please do provide the third unstated option). Under Atheism, there is no benefit to being right or wrong. Under theism, there could be a benefit to being right and an ill to being wrong. Thus, it is more logical to be theistic than atheistic. Other arguments, then, are needed to determine which form of theism (if any known form) is proper.
You say that there are no benefits to being right or wrong in atheism. That may be true of the next life, but it isn't true of this one. If atheism is correct, every sacrifice you have ever made for the sake of your beliefs has been a complete waste, and what's more, it was waste from the one chance at life you had. That's a nontrivial risk.
Furthermore, Pascal's wager makes some big assumptions that do not follow from the existence of a god. The existence of a god or gods does not imply the existence of an afterlife. An afterlife does not imply a binary distinction between eternal paradise and eternal torment, or anything of the sort. And a carrot/stick afterlife does not imply anything about how one gets the carrot while avoiding the stick.
We can concieve of a god who prefers to stay hidden, a god for whom our prayers are a torment, who rewards those who do not believe in the afterlife for not disturbing its peace in life. In such a case, there is a benefit to being an atheist even in the case theism is true!
Again, pish posh. You are making the false assumption that a thestic life is "wasted," a term that only has meaning if theism is assumed. If atheism is the reality, then any such judgement is merely the result of perspective and not of objective truth. Additionally, a theistic life tends to actually put a person into action (if I do X, then I'll receive Y), thereby increasing the likelihood that a theistic life, at least, would be productive (that doesn't necessitate, of course, that productivity is desirable).
When I speak of a theistic life being wasted, I speak of sacrifices made under the false assumtpion of the existence or nature of god(s). I mention this in the above response as well.
One could just as easily argue that an atheistic life tends to put a person into action (this is the only chance I've got, so I'd better make the best of it), thereby increasing the likelihood that an atheistic life would be productive. Both perspectives can inspire one to action.
However, I think you're misunderstanding both the ontological argument and Pascal's wager a bit. For the latter, if you say 'well, that's assuming another world', if you assume this world as well... it has been shown that the religious lead happier, better lives. That's been statistically proven. As such having a belief, any belief, is practically better than none. As for being able to decide the right one... what someone like Alston would say is that, though there is a great deal of consensus on science these days, there was a time where there were multiple (reputable!) schools of thought with conflicting ideas. However, just because there were different ideas did not make it unreasonable to pick a side. At least if you pick on you have a chance of finding something out. Indeed, Pascal's wager still shows the '1' chance of some given faith better than the '50' of Atheism! Why? Because the best you can hope for with atheism is oblivion. If there is a faith, and you're wrong, well, you've got hell (or whatever) anyway. Choose the wrong faith, and it's still the same. But at least you've got the chance of the best possible outcome. And as I've said, if you talk purely in the world, the same set applies: if you believe and there is no god, at least you've lived a happy life thinking so. What does it matter if you were wrong? Your darts example... I'd have at least thrown a blood dart! Okay, we get to the gates... I'll tell you 'well, at least I TRIED'. Hey, isn't that perfectly valid? You're never going to hit a dartboard, blindfolded, nonexisting, if you don't try. But at least if you try there's a chance, even if it's miniscule. I'm still better off.
I think my above reply on the topic of Pascal's Wager addresses what you've written here as well.
As for the ontological, it's not that God is the greatest thing possible, but the thing such as nothing greater can be conceived. Unfortunately, your counterexample of 'if I think of a world with humanity being in peace' example doesn't fly, as that's just another version of Gaunilo's 'perfect island' counter example, which Anslem manages to correct. See, an island is spacially and temporally limited. Therefore it is not that thing such as nothing greater can be conceived. Since 'humanity' is a multiple, and spacially located, would it not be better for that to be eternal? And omnipotent? You can only end up with 'omnigod' being that. And as Anslem put it, if you conceive it, it must be, because it is better to exist, and otherwise you are hold a contradiction. (BZ, by the way... I don't think you understand the argument in the way of Anslem.) The point is, maybe, yes, if what you said is the greatest thing you could conceive is such a world, then yes, that would be. But that's the same as saying 'God could sin if He wanted to.' Yes, He could. But it's a contrafactual, and tells us nothing. The thing is, such a world is NOT such that nothing greater can be conceived. In the end, it will be always reduced to eternal, undivided, omnipotent, omniscient... essentially, God. That is the only thing such as nothing greater can be conceived. But does it follow that actually having it IS that much better, and that it must exist? I've still not entirely thought through that one...
You and Anslem seem to assume that onmi-god is the greatest thing conceivable. Perhaps that is true for the two of you, in which case, god is your perfect island. An existence where you could never love another as an equal? An entity whose foreknowledge of his own actions condemns him to a fate beyond his making? There are greater things to conceive of still.
And you still haven't dealt with the problem of concievable by what? Are we speaking of the greatest thing that humans can conceive of, or that an arbitrary mortal can logically concieve of? What if there is something greater than what we can concieve, how do we know to stop at god and move on to the next question?
Furthermore, what happens if the true greatest thing that can be concieved of is simply not possible? You might say "Well, it's better to be possible than to be impossible..." but that's just word play. What if the greatest thing that can be concieved of has properties, that while all are neccisary to achieve peak greatness, are mutually exclusive? Are we to conclude that such an entity exists anyway? Hell, that's even giving Anslem the benefit of the doubt with his assertion that it is better to exist than not exist. This is not always the case. I'm certainly glad that there doesn't exist a faerie that follows me around, unshakable, ever vigilant, and which stabs me with a pitchfork every hour on the hour. I can concieve of such a thing, but I personally can't see how it would be better for such a creature to exist.
As for religious experience... you're making a mistake in your judgements. You say 'given the same treatment', but that's the fundamental error, assuming what holds true for consistency in one basic practise holds true for another. That approach cannot be applied. Yes, there is a certain level of consistency (though never can it tell as absolutely) to our senses. But does this mean there muse be consistency to our religous experience? If there were, it would imply reliability; but if there were't, it doesn't necessarially imply unreliablity, either. It's not a judgement that can be made. Ironically, I find this argument very compelling, even though I'm not one for religious experience, having never had one.
First you ask me why religious experience cannot be given the same treatement as the scientific knowledge, then when I give an example of what happens when religious experience does receive that same treatment, you call giving religious experience the same treatment as scientific knowledge is a mistake in my judgement. Which is it?
Furthermore, you say a God should be scientifically observable. Could it not easily be said that the fact that there is all of creation shows this? That everything we see at all is scientific proof? I don't personally like that argument, but if you're saying there should be a certain pattern, many say there IS a pattern. Just because you can't (or don't want to?) see it, doesn't mean it's not there. There are lots of patterns in things - numerical sequence, for exmple - that can only be discenred via knowledge of the matter and investigation. But it doen't work like that with God. The point is, scientific enquiry really shouldn't be used for it because, well, it lies outside its scope. That sort of inquiry just won't work, or rather will tell us just internal patterns that, to us, seem to be just 'natural.' Furthermore, I still stand by what I said regarding consistency. I don't mean so much a system of a moving gradient which should be see to change. I mean something which, in observation, might be there at one point, and gone the next, in observation. A cloud, for example. Yes, we can explain why it does this, to be sure. But the actual observation is of something that is there at one point, gone the next. This is not unreliable. As such, an experience which is inconsistent is not necessarially unreliable.
But ultimately, we understand the cloud and why it does what it does. If the scientific method is fine for learning about something inconsistent but reliable such as clouds, why is it inappropriate for learning about our inconsistent but reliable hypothetical diety in the manner I have proposed?
Ah, God might just be a convenient placeholder to a theory, it's true. But so is gravity. Tell me, why do we need 'some invisible force' that makes things fall. Why can't we just say 'things fall just because they do.' Why do we need a 'thing' there? And note no science can actually prove gravity, only the effects. So maybe it's just an effect. And if you're willing to put in an invisible force to account for an effect... why not have an invisible omni-god to account for the universe? We might do just as well saying 'things don't need that'... but we don't need to say 'gravity' either.
To suggest that gravity is merely what "makes things fall" is to underestimate the effects of the force of gravity. Further, gravity, while invisible, is detectable. It affects the universe in predictable fashions, even if we don't understand the exact mechanisms presently. Being willing to acknowledge an invisible force is a far cry from acknowledging an unknowable intellectual road block. That may seem harsh, but if our only answer to any question of why things behave the way they do is "goddidit", how can we hope to learn of and understand anything about the world in which we live?
If we simply said "God makes things fall" and let that be the end of it, we'd never have been to the moon. Hell, we'd never have invented the paper airplane.
Anyway, though, kudos to you for being Socratic - knowledge and virtue. And you have made very good arguments here. Always fun arguing with you.
I think it's a philosophy with a lot of merrit. This has been a particularly interesting argument; I've never heard Pascal's Wager defended so passionately.
